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ABSTRACT 
Cet éditorial offre un éclairage critique sur la théorie d'atteinte significative à 
l'Innovation effective déployée par la Commision européenne dans sa décision 
autorisant l'opération de concentration Dow/DuPont en 2017. 
In this short piece, I critically discuss the development of harm to innovation as 
a theory of anticompetitive harm in EU merger policy, following the conditional 
approval of the Dow/Dupont  in 2017.
 
 In the last few years, the European Commission’s (the 
“Commission”) assessment of horizontal mergers has been 
increasingly focused on innovation competition, particularly in 
mergers involving R&D intensive markets. In this context, the 
Commission’s decision in Dow/DuPont of March 2017 continues 
to be the subject of much debate almost a year after its adoption 
(Case COMP/M.7932 Dow/DuPont, para. 3297, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
mergers/cases/decisions/m7932_13668_3.pdf). The gist of this 
controversy consists in understanding whether the Commission 
has, in this case, intervened on the basis of a “novel” economic 
theory of harm in support of its finding that the merger created a 
risk of a significant impediment to effective innovation competition 
(“SIEIC”). 
From a legal standpoint, the root cause of the controversy is one of 
process. Introducing new theories of harm during merger review is 
akin to experimenting with new surgical techniques … without 
peer validation (and anaesthesia). This line of critique does not 
preclude the Commission from changing merger policy. Instead, it 
suggests that it is malpractice to introduce new policy on the job. 
Policy changes should follow an open process of “falsification,” so 
one can be sure that they are based on sound economic theory, 
backed by empirical evidence. This approach has been adopted 
time and time again in the past by the Commission. The debate that 
took place on minority shareholdings is a case in point. 
From an economics perspective, the stir is more foundational. The 
theoretical relationship between firm size, market structure and 
innovation remains unsettled since Joseph Schumpeter and 
Kenneth Arrow (J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy (1942); K. J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the 
Allocation of Resources for Invention, in The Rate and Direction 
of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors (NBER, 1962), 
pp. 609–626). Admittedly, some common ground was found 
around the idea that innovation thrives with contestability, 
appropriability and synergies (C. Shapiro: Competition and 
Innovation. Did Arrow Hit the Bull’s Eye?, in J. Lerner and S. 
Stern, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity Revisited, 2012, 
pp. 361–410). However, those “unifying” economic principles—
which denote that the relationship between concentration and 
innovation is essentially an empirical question—were called into 
question after Dow/DuPont when the Commission’s chief 
economist declared—albeit in a personal capacity—that his team 
had developed a new model that showed that post-merger, the 
parties “always” decreased their innovation efforts (see EU merger 
control and innovation, Competition policy brief, 2016–01, April 
2016, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/2016_001_e
n.pdf; G. Federico, G. Langus and T. Valletti, A Simple Model of 
Mergers and Innovation, Economics Letters, Vol. 157(C) (2017), 
pp. 136–140). Meanwhile, official statements from the 
Commission kept stressing that its assessment of innovation 
competition in Dow/DuPont belonged within ordinary garden 
variety unilateral effects analysis (Dow/DuPont innovation 
concerns ‘not novel’, EU insists, MLex Insight, Competition 
merger brief, Issue 2/2017, July, European Commission).  
The official publication of the redacted version of the Dow/DuPont 
decision in late 2017 provides a unique opportunity to check 
whether the early concerns voiced by legal and economic 
practitioners were indeed valid. On close reading, it seems that 
Dow/DuPont’s SIEIC analysis marks a small but significant 
change to the Commission’s merger policy in relation to innovation 
competition (I.). At the same time, however, the economic model 
of unilateral effects underpinning SIEIC is based on several critical 
assumptions which are not robust for innovation competition (II.). 
SIEIC: A small but significant change? 
The Commission has traditionally examined the impact of mergers 
on innovation competition. Many cases in the pharmaceutical, 
chemical, industrial and financial sectors have been remedied on 
the grounds of a post-merger risk of decreased incentives to 
innovate. However, Dow/DuPont strays from previous EU merger 
practice on three points. 
To start with, SIEIC extends the application of the standard 
unilateral effects model, which was previously used to assess 
pricing effects, to the assessment of innovation competition. 
Dow/DuPont is indeed the first case where the Commission 
explicitly relies on the unilateral effects framework in relation to 
innovation competition. In particular, SIEIC can be distinguished 
from the theory of “cannibalisation” developed earlier in 
Novartis/GSK Oncology (Case COMP M.7275 
Novartis/GlaxoSmithKline Oncology Business, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7275_20150128_20212_41
58734_EN.pdf). In this case, the Commission’s cannibalisation 
concerns related to clearly identified existing products. In contrast, 
the SIEIC theory developed in Dow/DuPont is “broader” since the 
harm to innovation applies to future products. (Ibid., para. 2108: 
“(…) cannibalisation is often meant to refer to a diversion of sales 
from one or several existing products to an innovative product sold 
by the same firm. Innovation competition, instead, more broadly 
refers to the extent to which innovative products of one firm may 
divert sales and profits from both existing and other innovative 
future products of rival firms. (...) “The Commission notes that its 
theory of harm rests on the broader notion of innovation 
competition rather than on the notion of cannibalisation.”)  
The second change brought about by SIEIC is that it dispenses with 
the delineation of relevant markets. Instead, Dow/DuPont looks at 
competition in “innovation spaces,” understood as “the discovery 
targets” over which firms compete (Case COMP/M.7932, 
Dow/DuPont, op. cit., para. 2168. The R&D undertaken in 
innovation spaces “generate[s] early pipeline products” (para. 
2159)). This feature of SIEIC is unprecedented. In all merger cases 
involving the pharmaceutical and crop protection sectors that 
preceded Dow/DuPont, the Commission had focused its 
assessment of innovation competition on existing and pipeline 
products. The shift in analytical framework seen in Dow/DuPont 
seems to expand the scope of the merger review to early stage 
R&D efforts, where products are several years away from reaching 
the market (for an early formulation of this point in a US context, 
see D. Wald and D. Feinstein, Merger Enforcement in Innovation 
Markets, Antitrust Source (2004) 1–11. In recent years, the 
Commission has increasingly taken into account early stage 
pipeline products in its merger reviews. This is reflected in a 
number of cases in the pharmaceutical sector where the 
Commission’s approach has diverged from its traditional method 
of focusing on phase III pipeline products. See for example 
Novartis/GlaxoSmithKline Oncology Business, op. cit., and Case 
COMP M.8041 J&J/Actelion, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m8401_74
0_3.pdf).  
Third, Dow/DuPont clarifies that the competitive harm envisaged 
in an SIEIC is a scenario of exit by one of the merging parties from 
an innovation space. The decision repeatedly talks of an immediate 
post-merger “discontinuation, deferment or redirection of 
competing lines of research and early pipeline products.” 
Admittedly, the idea of post-merger exit from lines of research and 
early pipeline products is not entirely new. For example, in 
GE/Alstom, the Commission found that GE had planned to 
discontinue parts of Alstom’s 50 Hz turbines product offering and 
related R&D capabilities. However, in GE/Alstom, the Commission 
had specifically identified the products and related activities that 
the merged entity was likely to shut down. In contrast, in 
Dow/DuPont, the Commission concluded that the merger would 
give rise to an SIEIC even though it conceded that it “may not be 
able to identify precisely which early pipeline products or lines of 
research the parties would likely discontinue.” 
Taken together, those three inflections from previous practice 
denote a policy change. It may not be a “quantum leap,” true (see, 
for an early suggestion to that effect, N. Petit, Significant 
Impediment to Industry Innovation: A Novel Theory of Harm in 
EU Merger Control? February 4, 2017, available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2911597 Readers of that previous paper 
are asked to forgive me for use of the expression “quantum leap”. 
At the time the Dow/DuPont decision had not been published. 
Given the modest numbers of downloads achieved by that earlier 
paper, I assume that its impact was insignificant). But it surely is 
not “business as usual.” 
Is unilateral effects theory robust for 
innovation competition? 
SIEIC predicts the exit of the merged firm from innovation spaces. 
The mechanics of exit from innovation spaces are similar to 
standard unilateral effects in price. As is well understood, in a 
merger between two close competitors X and Y, firm X will 
internalise the adverse effects on sales of price competition on firm 
Y. Hence, X has lower incentives to engage in price competition 
post-merger, and thus the merger gives rise to a significant 
impediment to effective competition. In an innovation setting, the 
assessment simply shifts its focus from post-merger price 
competition to R&D investments. X will internalise the adverse 
effects on (future) sales of R&D competition on firm Y. With 
reduced post-merger profits from innovation, X has lower 
incentives to engage in R&D competition, and the merger gives 
rise to an SIEIC. 
But can one substitute price with R&D in the standard unilateral 
effects framework without further adjustments to the model? Put 
differently, are the critical assumptions of a standard unilateral 
effects model involving price effects robust when non-pricing 
decisions, and in particular R&D decisions, are considered? Three 
factors are relevant. 
– First, while prices and output can—to some extent—be 
adjusted in the short term, firms are unable to discontinue 
R&D programmes at the flick of a switch. This is because 
R&D capital is essentially composed of sunk and specific 
assets. In addition, the labour component of R&D 
programmes creates rigidity (besides labour market 
regulation, there may be industry-specific factors that create 
a need to retain scientists in pharmaceutical companies to 
oversee the registration and regulatory approval process). 
Moreover, strategic considerations, such as maintaining an 
R&D programme for defensive patenting purposes, may 
come into play. All this suggests that R&D programmes 
create exit barriers, much like fixed capacity, long-term 
contracts, etc. 
– Second, even in the alternative exit scenario of a post-
merger redirection of R&D programmes, it is not a given that 
an adverse impact on welfare will ensue. The welfare costs 
of reduced competition within one innovation space may 
well be outweighed by the welfare benefits brought about by 
the increased coordination ability of the merged entity to 
deploy its R&D resources across a higher number of 
innovation spaces. And while it is true that this empirical 
question cannot be answered in the abstract, this does not 
justify ignoring it entirely in the context of an SIEIC 
analysis. 
– Third, SIEIC assumes away entirely the possibility that 
there may be post-merger intra-firm R&D competition in a 
same innovation space on account of the merged firms’ 
organisational structure. This, in turn, is a limitation of 
SIEIC because firms’ R&D structures are heterogeneous. 
There are varying degrees of centralisation both in terms of 
organisation structure—e.g., corporate-level v. business unit-
level R&D labs—and decision-making for R&D funding—
e.g., headquarter vetted v. business unit vetted R&D budgets 
(N. Agyres and B. Silverman, R&D, organization structure, 
and the development of corporate technological knowledge, 
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 25, Issue 8–9 (2004), 
p. 930). For example, DuPont is often cited as an example of 
the decentralised R&D model where research is conducted at 
the divisional level or within business units (ibid.). In 
practice, an assessment of innovation competition should 
thus examine the merging parties’ post-closing organisation 
plans. 
With this background, it is clear that while intuitively appealing, 
the current formulation of SIEIC is incomplete. SIEIC pays no 
heed to several critical issues, such as the structural rigidity of 
R&D resources, the counterbalancing effect of intra-firm 
coordination across innovation spaces, or the organisational 
structure of R&D in a merged firm. Taken together, these factors 
can plausibly decrease the opportunity cost of innovation as well as 
outweigh the internalised cost of innovation cannibalisation. Short 
of their consideration, SIEIC remains a fragile basis for merger 
remediation. 
Conclusion 
In a “forgotten paragraph” of Tetra Laval (Case C-12/03 P, 
Commission v. Tetra Laval, [2005] ECR I 987, para. 328, available 
at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=& 
docid=49926&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=fi
rst&part=1&cid=630078; M. Jaeger, The Standard of Review in 
Competition Cases Involving Complex Economic Assessments: 
Towards the Marginalisation of the Marginal Review?, Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice Vol. 2, No. 4 (2011), 
pp. 295–314), the Court of Justice of the EU has required the EU 
Commission to discharge a “burden of persuasion” in relation to 
complex economic analysis (this expression was coined by I. 
Liannos and C. Genakos, Econometric evidence in EU competition 
law: an empirical and theoretical analysis, in I. Lianos and D. 
Geradin (eds.), Handbook on European Competition Law: 
Enforcement and Procedure, Edward Elgar Publishing (2013)). 
Arguably, SIEIC falls within this category. Future cases will tell us 
if SIEIC can survive the test of accuracy, reliability, consistency 
and completeness required by the case law. Without prejudging on 
forthcoming improvements in merger analysis, a close reading of 
Dow/DuPont suggests, however, that in current formulation, SIEIC 
theory is too crude to produce empirical findings in relation to 
innovation competition (for more on the above, a comprehensive 
study of those issues can be found at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3113077).  
